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INTRODUCTION
According to Aristotle, "There are only two parts to a speech:
you make a statement and you prove it."

All debate is based on

this theory, however, the process is not as simplistic as Aristotle's
statement would indicate.

Debate is more than a cumulative

stacking of statements and proofs; "it involves the clash of
arguments and ideas, of strategies and tactics."^

It is a process
2
in which opposing sides struggle in verbal controversy.
Debate is one of man's oldest activities.

When two primitive

men attempted to lay claim to the same territory or the same food,
a debate undoubtedly ensued.
among the ancient Greeks.

Debate was a highly polished art

When nobles disagreed, they could debate

their proposals before the king who acted as a judge.

3

Any time

a man has had to compare alternative situations, the merits of those

1

Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate (Skokie, 111., 1975), p. 16.

2
Eugene R. Moulton, The Dynamics of Debate (New York, 1966),
p. 4.
3
James M. Murphy and Jon M, Ericson, The Debater's Guide
(Indianapolis, 1961), p, 13,
1

2
situations may have been debated with another person or within
himself.
Debate is an integral part of our American society.
a part of our tradition.

It is

"A succession of great debates have

crystalized the thinking of citizens and...shaped the course of
our nation."

4

Landmark debates have included those at the Con

stitutional Convention, the Webster-Hayne confrontations, the
Lincoln-Douglas debates and the Kennedy-Nixon television clashes.
Our legislative bodies frequently employ debates in resolving
issues.

The right to free speech allows us to propose a new

solution, to debate an issue, or to defend the status quo.
Debate is a viable intercollegiate academic activity.

Through

debate research, students learn to analyze and organize material.
During case formulation and actual debates they develop standards
for evaluating evidence and discover logical connections.

Since

debate is a fluid situation, students must learn to adapt quickly.
If their ideas are to be heard and to be accepted they must also
learn the techniques of effective public address.

This training

is not something that will be filed away after college is completed,
but training that will better equip them to live in American society.

4
James H. McBath (ed.). Argumentation and Debate: Principles
and Practices (New York, 1963), p. 3.

3
Hopefully, debate will provide the initial motivation for continuing
inquiry into controversial and significant public issues.
The first academic debate in the United States was a form of
"syllogistic disputation" similar to that of the Middle Ages.
Early in the 18th Century students took the lead in establishing
a more flexible format that was better suited to the times.

5

Since the beginning of the 19th Century additional elements have
been introduced into academic debate such as tournaments, inter
national debates, forensic honoraries, and new forms of debate
(p. 14).

A continual process of redefinition and refinement has

occurred.
As debate has developed, so too have the options open to the
negative and affirmative teams.

No longer is a traditional plan-

meets-need case the only affirmative option.

They may also run

comparative advantage, criteria or alternative justification cases.
Currently the four major negative case structures are direct
refutation, defense of the status quo, repairs of the status quo
and the counterplan.

Of these, the counterplan is the most con

troversial .

5
David Potter, "The Debate Tradition" in Argumentation and
Debate: Principles and Practice, ed. James H. McBath (New York,
1963), p. 32.

4
In a counterplan, which has also been known as a "counter
proposal" or a "counter proposition", the negative team, rather
than directly refuting the affirmative plan, elects to present a
plan of its own.

Through the implementation of a counterplan,

debate changes from a bipolar situation with participants arguing
for or against a single solution to a more flexible situation which
permits a multi-sided examination of the problem.

In addition, it

allows the negative an option for a status quo which may be hard
to defend.
Debate theory often lags behind debate practice and such is the
case with the counterplan.

Though counterplans were discussed in

an article by Lambertson in 1943, at that time debate teams were
just beginning to formulate concrete, concise plans and counterplans were almost non-existant.^

The debate texts of the 1960's

contained little information about counterplans and views of them
were not positive.

They were considered unusual techniques ^ and

too risky because the negative had to accept the burden of proof.

g

6
"Plan and Counter-Plan in a Question of Policy", Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XXIX (1943), 48-52.

7
Murphy and Ericson, p. 55.
8
Otto F. Bauer, Fundamentals of Debate (Glenview, 111., 1966),
p. 39.

5
Debate judges were unimpressed with counterplans not "because
there [was] anything wrong with them but because they [were] so
poorly done."

9

Terry, in 1970, felt a counterplan should be used

only when "the negative is truly convinced that the status quo is
inherently defective."Most judges are psychologically 'turned
off by the counterplan and thus it is the least desirable"
negative strategy in debating a traditional affirmative case (p. 7).
Even as recently as 1975, Wood said counterplans were considered
relatively uncommon and judges were biased against them because this
was a strategy usually used by teams who wished to trick their
opponents (p. 121).
Though the predominate theoretical view has been against counterplans, there have been a few articles and a text which have looked
at them from a positive, instructional perspective.^^

While counter-

plan theory has lagged, counterplan use has increased to such a

9
David W. Shephard and Paul H. Cashman, A Handbook for
Beginning Debaters (Minneapolis, 1966), p. 63.
10
Donald R. Terry (ed.). Modern Debate Case Techniques
(Skokie, 111., 1970), p. 7.
11

Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A General Theory
of the Counterplan", Journal of the American Forensic Association,
XII (1975), 70-79; James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro
and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis on
Argumentation Theory," Journal of the American Forensic Association,
XI (1974),1-7; Deborah Elsie Ziegler, "Competitive Policy Systems

6
degree that the questionnaires for the 1974, 1975, and 1977
National Debate Tournament

Booklet of Judges have included questions

on counterplans.
It appears that counterplans have become a viable negative
strategy but there is a lack of consistent counterplan criteria
and techniques for debaters to follow.

In addition, there is a

controversy among judges about the acceptability of the counterplan.

The latter is compounded by a disagreement as to whether

counterplans should be judged by traditional debate theory or
systems theory.
With those problems in mind literature on counterplans and
National Debate Tournament judging philosophy sheets have been
surveyed for the purpose of clarifying this negative strategy.
It is hoped that by combining judges' views and written theory
the lag between debate theory and debate practice will be decreased.

and the Counterplan," Issues (March, 1974), and Gregory W.
Trianosky, "Counterplan as a Competitive System," Issues (May,
1974 in Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching,
ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie, 111., 1974); Bernard L. Brock,
James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan and James F. Klumpp, Public
Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages
Debate (New York, 1973).

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Theories
There are two major theories of debate: traditional and
General Systems Theory.

The most fundamental difference between

the two lies in "the points of judgment upon which policy judgments are based."

12

Traditional theory focuses on a particular problem and solu
tions.

The causal argument and inherency are of vital importance.

A traditional stock issues case, whether affirmative or negative,
must be structured to show (1) the evils or problems of the status
quo, (2) that these problems are produced by causes that can be
remedied, (3) that the policy or action proposed will remedy the
problems and (4) that the remedy is workable and practical.

In a

counterplan debate, the negative will usually accept the affir
mative's designation of the problem area and then try to prove
advantages for their plan in terms of remedying the problem,
workability and practicality.

In other words, they will integrate

their plan with the affirmative case.

12
James F. Klumpp, et al., p. 3.

7

8
General Systems Theory debate focuses on a range of alter
native policy options.

Rather than subscribing to a single cause

of a problem it recognizes multiple causality.

The proper policy

is not related to a single cause but there is a choice of alter
native causes, any one of which may have the same end result
(equifinality).

At the same time any one cause may have multiple

effects and the value of each effect must be considered.

The

question of the permanence of the problem which has been isolated
by the affirmative and the proof that the plan will meet the need
become probability arguments.

In other words, they indicate that,

given these factors, the undesirable effect will be diminished
with a change but the change need not be that designated by the
affirmative team.

13

Types of Counterplans
There are three types of counterplans:

conditional, systems

theory and straight.
When employing a conditional counterplan, the negative
"maintains that the status quo is functioning adequately but even if
it were not, their plan would be more beneficial than the affirmative

13
Ibid., 1-7.

9
plan.

,.14

In a systems theory counterplan situation, the negative

is not required to concede the affirmative "need" or to address
the same areas as the affirmative case.

They can draw from a wide

range of potential counterplans as long as they are competitive
with the affirmative proposal.
The straight, or standard traditional counterplan can be sub
divided into contingent or non-contingent counterplans.

A con

tingent counterplan is dependent upon the affirmative plan.
employs all of the planks of that plan but implementation.

It
Thus,

the same advantages are accrued, but the plan might be implemented
at the state level rather than at the federal level.

A non-

contingent counterplan extends beyond the scope of the affirmative
plan.

For example, the affirmative may propose implementation of

a federal minimum annual income program for medical personnel
through the use of vouchers for general medical services.

The

negative will then counterplan by implementing prepaid group practice
at the state level in addition to cash assistance.

Both achieve

the same advantage--guaranteed income and necessary medical assis15
tance—but through different means.

14
Ziegler, p. 163.
15
Ibid.

10
Need Analysis
When considering counterplan use, the negative debate team will
adapt one of three strategies to analyze the need areas specified
in the first affirmative constructive speech.

The negative may

(1) accept the entire need as defined by the affirmative, (2)
accept it in part, or (3) say that the affirmative has defined the
need incorrectly and present their own analysis of need.
of these alternatives has been the most commonly employed.

The first
When

the negative accepts the affirmative need, they then show that there
is a better solution which is not possible under the affirmative
plan.

This solution must correct the same problems as the affirma

tive case.

The negative must be careful that the counterplan deals

only with the problems specifically stated by the affirmative and
not with problems " i t wishes the affirmative had r a i s e d . I f
the negative adopts the second strategy and accepts a portion of the
need, they must refute the remainder of the affirmative need con
tentions.

The third strategy, non-acceptance of the affirmative need,

is employed if the negative believes that the affirmative has in
adequately analyzed the present system or if they wish to deal with
other problems within the status quo.

16

Robert F. Newman, The Pittsburgh Code for Academic Debate
(Pittsburgh, 1964), p. 21.
17
Bauer, p. 39.

n
Requirements
Competitive. ^Any counterplan presented by the negative must
be competitive with the affirmative proposal.

The counterplan

can be functionally competitive, or structurally or philosophically
substitutive.

Systems theory defines "competitive" as mutually

exclusive and/or more desireable when adopted alone than if adopted
simultaneously with the affirmative plan.
A "functionally competitive" counterplan will achieve the same
goals as the affirmative plan and be the superior option.

In a

"structurally substitutive" counterplan, the "laws in which the two
policy options are embodied logically contradict one another."

18

It would be impossible to adopt and implement both simultaneously.
In a "philosophically substitutive" counterplan the adoption of
one plan is philosophically inconsistent with the adoption of the
other plan.

For instance, one plan may give people a minimum

guaranteed annual income, while the other provides additional jobs
so that people can earn a minimum annual income (p. 166).

Tra

ditional debate theorists, who have been in the majority, feel
a competitive counterplan must correct the same problems

18
Trianosky, p. 165.

19
Wood, p. 124.

19

and/or

12
accrue the affirmative advantages.

20

The counterplan is com

petitive in that it offers an alternative solution.
Under the systems theory definitions if a counterplan is
"mutually exclusive" it cannot exist simultaneously with the affir
mative plan.

Mutual exclusivity can be proved by the negative

without acknowledging criticisms of the status quo and without
dealing with the problem

areas the affirmative has established.

To fulfill the second systems theory criterion, that of being "more
desirable

when implemented alone rather than when implemented

simultaneously with the affirmative", it is unnecessary for the
negative to accept any of the affirmative analysis or even deal with
the problem areas cited by the affirmative.

They may not, however,

ignore the affirmative because they must prove their plan is more
desireable than simultaneous enactment of both plans.
Non-topical.
it be non-topical.

21

A second requirement for the counterplan is that
If it in any way fulfills all of the require

ments of the resolution or the implications of the debate topic, it
can be construed as support for the proposition.

The negative

need not vary more than one of the major terms of the proposition;

20

Ziegler, p. 161.
21
Lichtman and Rohrer, pp. 5-7.

13
however, the change must be significant.

For instance, 50 states

acting in a similar manner is not substantially different than a
federal government edict.
Prima facie.

When the negative presents a counterplan it must

contain the prima facie elements of harm, significance, and inherency
22
(uniqueness).
The negative then accepts the burden of proof to
demonstrate that its plan is workable, practical and more desirable
than the affirmative proposal.
quo.

It loses the presumption of the status

The negative must be careful not to confuse the counterplan with

the adjustment and/or repairs case, which accepts the status quo
with modifications, as a policy alternative to the affirmative plan.
In summary, there are three essential requirements of a counterplan.

(1) It must be competitive with the affirmative proposal,

meeting any of the five definitions noted above.
topical.

(2) It must be non-

That is, it may not fulfill the requirements of the

resolution.

(3) It must be presented as a prima facie case which is

capable of standing until refuted.
Presumption and Burden of Proof
As noted in the preceding paragraph, if the negative presents
^ prima facie case they lose presumption and accept the burden of
proof.

There are, however, differences of opinion among theorists

22
Ziegler, p. 161.

14
as to the definition of presumption and the acceptance of the burden
of proof.
The term, "presumption", was first introduced by Bishop Whately
who defined it as follows:
There is a Presumption in favour of every existing
institution. Many of these (we will suppose the
majority) may be susceptible of alteration for
the better; but still the "Burden of proof" lies with
him who proposes an alteration; simply, on the ground
that since a change is not a good in itself, he who
demands a change should shew cause for it.^^
Views since that time have been inconsistent.

24

Even when there is

an acknowledged need for a change in the status quo it is a need for
change and not for the specific change advocated by the affirmative.

25

If we accept these traditional views of presumption we can then
say it operates in favor of the negative in a "standard" debate.

26

With the introduction of a counterplan, the negative loses pre
sumption and thus, an inherent advantage.
A more flexible definition is offered by Cronkhite.

He states

that the party who initiates a dispute (the affirmative) automatically

Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: 1851), 79.
24
Gary Cronkhite, "The Locus of Persumption", Central States
Speech Journal XVII (1966), 270-277.
Austin J. Freeley, Decision by Debate (New York: 1963), p. 32.
Newman, p. 14.

15
awards presumption to his opponent.

The "occupation of ground or

existence as status quo is only a frequently accompanying character
istic accorded the presumption" (p. 273).

If we accept this

definition, the negative then maintains presumption when they
employ a counterplan.
General Systems Theory also has applicability to the assign
ment of presumption.

Lichtmann and Rohrer chastise traditionalists

for accepting presumption as a decision rule.

They say presumption

can be used to identify the policy system which is accorded pre
judgement but the standard necessary to overcome presumption must
be specified as well.

Rather than arbitrarily awarding presumption

to the existing system it should be awarded to the system with the
greater degree of certainty.

Under these circumstances it is con

ceivable that the locus of presumption could change within a debate
as the uncertainty of a new plan (affirmative or counterplan) is
diminished.^^
The assignment of presumption to one side determines that the
opposing side must accept the burden of proof and present a prima
facie case.

Views on this are varied in the counterplan situation.

27
Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A Systems Approach
to Presumption and Burden of Proof", Issues (February and December,
1974) in Advanced Debate, pp. 8-15.

16
Some theorists feel, as noted previously, that both affirmative
and negative must present a prima facie case.

As recently as 1975

Wood stated that although the negative loses presumption by
admitting there are problems in the status quo, the affirmative
still has the burden of proof for the propostion.

The only dif

ference in the affirmative position is that they no longer need to
debate the need issue.

They must, however, still prove that the

change, as stated in the proposition, is the best solution to the
problem (p. 28).

This location of burden of proof was earlier

advocated by Freeley.

28

Another view of the locus of burden of

proof in a counterplan debate is that it is jointly shared by the
affirmative and the negative.

29

A fourth view considers burden of

proof as a requirement that every speaker support his assertions.

30

As can be noted from the above, there has been a lack of con
sistent clarity on these concepts with subsequent confusion for
both debaters and judges, particularly when a counterplan is intro
duced.

Later in this paper current judging practices regarding

presumption and burden of proof in a counterplan debate will be

28

Argumentation and Debate, p. 77.
29
Terry, p. 7.
30
Murphy and Ericson, p. 99.

17
examined in an attempt to reduce this ambiguity.
Functions of the Counterplan
The counterplan has been considered an effective negative
strategy under the following conditions;

(1) When a problem or

problems in the status quo have been generally recognized.

31

(2)

When the affirmative has delineated a situation that is more
desirable

than the status quo, but less desirable

alternative.

32

than the negative

( 3 ) When the negative feels the affirmative has

inaccurately defined the problem and/or their plan does not solve
the problem(s) of the status quo.
for specific action to be taken.

33

34

(4) When the proposition calls
( 5 ) when case surprise is an

effective strategy.

31
Roger E. Nebergall, "The Negative Counterplan", Speech
Teacher, VI (1957), 217.
32
Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "The Role of the
Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of Academic Debate" in
Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 57.
33
Freeley, p. 214.
34
Russell R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and
Advocacy (New York, 1967), p. 77.

18
The clash in a counterplan debate results from the negative
attempts to prove the superiority of its plan.

If the negative

does not accept the affirmative's definition of the problem, the
debate can dissolve into a no-clash situation with advocates arguing
two different, unrelated plans.

This has been the problem with many

counterplan debates in the past and may partially explain why the
counterplan has been looked upon with disfavor by theorists and
judges alike.
In the systems theory counterplan situation a clash occurs
for two major reasons:

(1) The negative will attempt to prove that

its plan meets the two "competitive" criteria stated earlier in this
paper while the affirmative will try to prove the opposite.

(2)

The negative will attempt to maximize the "costs" of the affirmative
proposal and minimize the benefits.

The net benefits sought in a

policy system debate are "a function of both the probability that
the system will achieve results and the values placed on those
ii35
results."

The affirmative will attempt a similar analysis of the

negative proposal.
Structure
The structuring of a traditional counterplan has not changed

35
Brock, et. al., p. 122.

19
markedly since Lambertson suggested the negative ask itself the
following questions in setting up a counterplan.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What are the limitations of the affirmative plan?
What is the nature of the negative plan?
How is it more workable than the affirmative plan?
Why is it more desirable than the affirmative plan?
How can it create fewer or less serious evils than the
affirmative plan?36

Moulton has suggested the negative attack should be structured
in the following manner:
to the affirmative.

(1) Grant the evils of the present system

These should, however, be expanded to the point

where the affirmative plan can not solve the problems.

The negative

must, in addition, be prepared to meet the affirmative need for a
change arguments.

(2) Attack the affirmative solution.

be done in several ways.

This may

The negative may show that the affirmative

plan does not solve the problems addressed in the status quo, that
the affirmative plan has more disadvantages than advantages, that
the negative solution entails less serious disadvantages than the
affirmative or that the affirmative plan is unworkable or impractical.
(3) Present the new negative plan for comparison.

After having

enumerated the benefits of their plan, the negative should explain
clearly why it is superior to the affirmative plan.
to defend the plan against attack.

(4) Be ready

37

36
"Plan and Counterplan in a Question of Policy", p. 49.
37
Eugene R. Moulton, The Dynamics of Debate (New York, 1966), p.

20
One of the restrictions traditional theorists have placed on
the negative in building their case is that "all negative arguments
must be adapted to the specific features of the particular affirmative plan."

38

A discrepancy exists here because other theorists

feel the negative may redefine the need.

If they do, they must be

sure that the need, as redefined, is perfectly integrated with
their counterplan.
In a counterplan situation, the negative has several advantages.
They may choose which i^ue or issues to contest

•30

which disadvantages they wish to advance (p. 244).

as well as
The major

advantage is that they can force the affirmative to change roles
and debate on negative ground.

If this happens, it is likely

that the affirmative, in defending itself against negative attacks,
will spend insufficient time rebuilding its case.

Then the negative

can argue in rebuttal that even if the counterplan is rejected, the
affirmative's proposal should not be accepted because it has been
inadequately supported.

38
Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate
(New York, 1963), p. 244.
39
Ibid., p. 245.
40
Wood, p. 124.

21
Systems theory enhances the strategic value of the counterplan
by allowing the negative greater lattitude in the selection of their
plan and arguments and greater creativity in designing a competitive
counterplan.

In addition, it provides a rationale for assessing

the legitimacy of counterplans.

41

The Affirmative Response to the Counterplan
In the past, it has been alleged that in a counterplan situation,
the first affirmative constructive speech which deals primarily
with the need issue is a wasted speech.

This is incorrect, because

any plan advanced by the affirmative must solve the specified need.

42

In many instances that speech also provides the ground on which the
debate is to continue.
In responding to the counterplan one of the worst things the
affirmative can do is assume that its obligations have changed.

They

must utilize the same basic strategies employed under any negative
attack.

That is, they must uphold the burden of proof, maintain

the attack on the status quo and attempt to narrow the debate.
In a traditional debate, if the negative has conceded the problems
of the status quo, the second affirmative constructive speaker should

41
Brock, et. al., pp. 178-180.
42
McBath, p. 115.

22
then review his colleague's analysis of the need issue and, if the
negative has suggested that there are other defects in the present
system, either "deny that the defects exist or suggest that the
present system is taking care of them."

43

It is conceivable that

the alleged defects cited by the negative will be outside the problem
area defined by the affirmative.
The affirmative, must then move to a direct comparison of the
two plans.

The first criterion is "Which plan best meets the need?"

The affirmative has the advantage here because they have specified
the need and carefully integrated their plan to solve that need.
The next step is to compare relative costs, workability,
practicality and efficiency of the two plans (p. 123).

If the

affirmative can prove their plan is better or if both the affirmative
plan and the counterplan can be adopted simultaneously, it should
result in an affirmative win.
The affirmative can lose if they misanalyze the proposition or
forget to uphold the burden of proof, both of which could be reasons
for a loss in any debate.

A loss could result if the affirmative lets

the negative shift its ground.

The affirmative has defined the

problem and the debate must stay in that "arena" or there will be no
clash.

Losing the offense could also result in an affirmative loss.

43
Wood, p. 122.

23
They must keep their case uppermost in the judge's mind and be
careful not to get into an exclusive position of defending against
the counterplan (p. 124).
The following is a description of the major emphasis in each
of the affirmative and the negative speeches in a counterplan debate.
lAC -- The affirmative proposal is needed.
INC -- Agree that something must be done. The
negative counterplan is better than the
affirmative proposal.
2AC -- The affirmative proposal is superior to the
negative counterplan.
2NC -- The affirmative proposal would be disadvan
tageous.
INR -- Refutation of alleged affirmative advantages
over the negative counterplan.
lAR -- Refutation of alleged disadvantages. Refu
tation of negative claims of advantages.
2NR -- Refutation of unresolved arguments...
2AR -- Refutation of unresolved arguments.
Decision Rules
When assigning a decision in a counterplan debate, the judge
will, of course, consider many of the factors mentioned earlier in
this paper, presumption and burden of proof being of prime impor
tance.

The first criterion is "Which team, through logical argu

mentation, has shown that its plan is better?"

If the two plans

appear equal the judge must then turn to a second criterion.

In a

44
Arthur B. Miller and Remo P. Fausti, Elements of Deliberative
Debating (Belmont, Calif., 1969), p. 56.

24
traditional debate, this may be the need issue.

The affirmative

will receive the decision if they have sufficiently proved the
need for a change.

Should the opposite be true, the ballot would

not be a vote for the negative but against the affirmative.

The

negative must prove that its plan alone is superior while the
affirmative has the option of proving that its plan or the simul
taneous enactment of both plans is .the superior option.

There may

be situations in which neither team has established the inadequacy
of the status quo.
policy.

The judge will then have to vote on the better

In any case, the judge must make a decision on how the

debate was presented and not on how he wishes it had been presented.
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Lichtman and Rohrer have suggested that judges who utilize
presumption as a decision rule do so erroneously because the assign
ment of presumption is only the first step.

A standard of critical

assessment should then be applied to factors such as the extent of
the change and the state of the status quo.

If such a system were

established, the judges would have a "value" number system from which
to work.

This could facilitate decision-making and produce greater

consistency in judging.'^®
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Newman, p. 26.
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"A Systems Approach to Presumption and Burden of Proof",
pp. 22-43.
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In sunmary, when the negative presents a counterplan, they
may employ either traditional or systems theory analysis.

If

they utilize a traditional approach they must first deal with the
analysis of need presented by the affirmative.

Regardless of

which type of analysis is used, the counterplan must be competitive,
non-topical and prima facie.

Much of the clash in the debate will

result from the negative's attempts to prove the superiority and/or
the competitiveness of their plan.
The negative which employs a counterplan has several advantages.
For example, they may choose the issues and advantages they wish
to advance and attempt to force the affirmative to debate on
negative ground.

In defeating any negative advantages, the affir

mative must uphold the burden of proof, maintain the attack on
the status quo, attempt to narrow the debate and prove the super
iority of their plan.
Since presumption is usually considered to rest with the status
quo, its location can become a confused and confusing issue in the
counterplan debate.

According to Lichtman and Rohrer, presumption

should not be used as a decision rule.

If only one criterion needs

to be used it should be the superiority of the plan.
Thus far, this paper has dealt with the theory of the counterplan debate as expressed in texts and magazine articles.

These

views can be compared and contrasted with those of the National
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Debate Tournament judges who represent contemporary practice in
counterplanning.

ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT JUDGES' SHEETS
For the past four years, prior to the National Debate Tournament,
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the Tournament Committee has sent out a questionnaire to

all coaches and guest judges who would be judging at that tourna
ment.

From six to eight questions have been asked on debate theory

and technique; however, the questions have not precluded additional
statements by the respondents.
been:

Some of the questions asked have

"What role does cross-examination play in your evaluation

of a debate?"

"Do you see yourself as a chooser of policy systems,

as a judge of 'who did a better job of debating', or in some other
role as a judge?"

"Under what, if any, circumstances will you vote

negative when no disadvantages are carried by the negative?

Why?"

Responses to the questions were then printed in a National Debate
Tournament Booklet of Judges which was made available to the par
ticipants at each tournament.
The coaches, who were from all nine American Forensic Association
Districts in the United States, had teams competing in that tourna
ment.

Additionally, guest judges had been selected because of their

47
This is sponsored by the American Forensic Association.
27

28

reputations as outstanding decision-makers.

The responses of these

National Debate Tournament judges should be representative of
current debate theory and contemporary judging practices at the
intercollegiate level.

On this assumption, responses to relevant

questions on those philosophy sheets have been analyzed with the
intent of obtaining an overview of the most current counterplan
theory.

In analyzing the answers to the selected questions per

centile figures have been computed, wherever possible.

When the

numbers of specific responses were small and resulting percentage
figures would be misleading, a composite view of the stated
philosophies is presented instead.
1977 Booklet of Judges - The Counterplan
The most comprehensive question dealing with the counterplan
was asked on the questionnaire for the 1977 National Debate Tourna
ment, April 15-18 at Southwest Missouri State College in Springfield,
Missouri.

This question was;

affected by counterplans?
counterplan?

"How are your judging procedures

What must the negative do to sustain the

What must the affirmative do to defeat the counterplan?"

Of the eighty-seven judges whose philosophy sheets were in
cluded in that booklet, eighty-four addressed themselves to the
question in varying degrees of comprehensiveness.

Unless specified

otherwise, percentile figures have been based on those eighty-four
judges' and coaches' comments.
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Though the question did not solicit an opinion of counterplans
per se, seven of the judges (8.3%) said that they did not like
them.

In general, they felt counterplan theory and practice had

not been adequately defined and, as a consequence, debaters did not
use this strategy effectively.

One critic said counterplans were

unwise because the negative had to give up presumption and in
herency.

Only two of the judges said that they had heard counter-

plans infrequently.
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In a few instances judges stated their

positive reactions toward counterplans but most simply addressed
the questions.
"What must the negative do to sustain the counterplan?"
Since the counterplan is initiated in a debate as a negative
strategy, this portion of the question was analyzed first.

The

following is an overview of the counterplan drawn from the judging
philosophy sheets.
When the negative elects to use a counterplan, it must be
presented in the first negative constructive speech.

The counter-

plan must be unambiguous, specifically detailed, fully developed
and formulated in a manner similar to that of the affirmative plan
in the areas of procedures, enforcement, etc.

In other words, it
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In analyzing the bookets from the past four years, this type
of response was found occurring most frequently in District 4 which
includes Iowa, North and South Dakota and Minnesota; however numbers
are too small to draw any definitive conclusions.
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must be a prima facie case.

The counterpTan must offer a distinct

alternative solution to that of the affirmative.
The two most frequently mentioned requirements for a counterplan were that the plan be non-topical (72.6% of the respondents)
and competitive (67.9%) with the affirmative plan.

Other re

quirements included solvency, superiority to the affirmative plan,
and more advantageous and/or less disadvantageous than the
affirmative.
Due, in part, to an apparent disagreement over the definition
of "competitive" fourty-four of those mentioning it as a criterion
(77.2%) defined the term.

The definitions varied according to the

judge's bias toward traditional (54.8%) or systems theory debate
^ 49
(32.5%).
The remaining judges gave definitions which were either
unclear or could not be classified under either theory.

One judge

gave his definitions for both perspectives.
Twenty-two of those with traditional viewpoints (50%) said
simply that the counterplan must deal with the same problem area
as the affirmative plan while 41.7 percent stated that it must meet

Judging biases were determined as follows: (1) Some judges
stated that they employed traditional or systems theory approaches.
(2) If a judge's comments dealt with aspects of traditional theory
such as accepting the affirmative definition of need, they were
considered traditionalists. (3) When terminology used or areas of
analysis were a part of systems theory, the judges were classified
as being of that philosophy.
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the affirmative advantages.

This was specified still further by

20.8 percent who said the counterplan must accrue the same lives
saved (or more) and/or be competitive in terms of money spent.
Of the two systems theory definitions of "competitive" -mutually exclusive and more desirable than both plans implemented
simultaneously--the latter was the more frequent response (85.7%).
Mutually exclusive was mentioned by 57.1 percent of the systems
theory judges.

Some judges mentioned both definitions.

Other

systems theory judges either stated they judged competitiveness
"according to the systems theory definition"
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or gave rationale

such as "must equal affirmative significance and possess additive
advantages that exceed the affirmative advantages or the dis
advantages of the counterplan."

Two of the judges said that the

plans must be mutually exclusive but due to other conunents they did
(or did not) make it was not feasible to classify them within the
systems theory perspective and consequently their responses were
not classified in either theory.
Though the term, "substitutional", has been considered by
some as a definition of "competitive," four judges listed the two
terms as separate entities.

Some thought the negative's definition

of competitive was a debatable issue.

Others said they would deter

mine the competitiveness of the negative policy by weighing the
benefits and costs.
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Unless indicated otherwise, all quoted statements in this
section of the paper are from NOT judges.

If the counterplan is judged from a traditional viewpoint,
it must "demonstrate solvency of 100 percent of the problem area
isolated by the affirmative."

In doing so, the negative must

assume the same plan-meet-need burden of proof as the affirmative
but must do so in a superior fashion.

This can be demonstrated

through the assignment of significant disadvantages to the af
firmative case.
Several of the judges (21.2%) stated that the counterplan must
be the superior option.

"Superior" can mean that it is superior to

the affirmative plan or superior to the solution called for in the
resolution.

It does not mean that the negative must meet all of

the affirmative advantages but rather, that they must do so in a
superior way.
The responses on advantages and disadvantages were extremely
varied because they could and did deal with any of the four possible
areas:

affirmative advantages, negative advantages, affirmative

disadvantages, negative disadvantages.

The most cohesive group

of answers dealt with negative advantages.
of this area was as follows:

The general overview

The most frequent response (68% of

those responding on this issue) was that the negative policy should
accrue more or better advantages.
unnecessary.

Sixteen percent said this was

Some judges felt that all affirmative advantages must

be achieved; but two judges said "nearly all" was sufficient.

One judge said that advantages could only be accrued from parts of
the plan which were competitive with the affirmative proposal while
another stated that a substantially different alternative should
be used to meet the affirmative advantages.

Two judges said that

the advantages should be based on a departure from the resolution.
Little major consensus was found in this area.
In summary, generalizing from the responses included in the
Booklet of Judges, the

counterplan must be non-topical, deal

effectively with the advantages accrued by the affirmative, have
fewer disadvantages, solve the problems originally designated by
the affirmative and be the superior option.

When considered

from a traditional perspective, competitiveness was seen to be
achieved most advantageously by dealing with the affirmative problem
area.

From a systems approach, a competitive counterplan was most

frequently seen as one which is more desireable than the two plans
existing simultaneously.
Presumption which usually is accorded to the status quo, be
comes an important issue in a counterplan debate because the status
quo is not being defended.

As a consequence thirty-three (37.9%)

of the judges stated their opinions about the locus of presumption.
One of those statements was too ambiguous to be included in the
analysis.
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Of the thirty-two known judge's opinions about presumption,
sixteen (50%) said that the negative forfeits presumption when
using a counterplan thus giving them an additional burden, the
burden of proof which they did not have before.

One of those said

it was granted to the affirmative because it then became the
established system (the developed policy against the negative
alternative).

In direct contradiction to this, eight (25%)

said that presumption did not shift.

Some of these judges viewed

presumption as resting against the adoption of the resolution or
against the specific affirmative case rather than with the status quo.
Several other opinions were also expressed.

Four of the judges

considered presumption as resting with the team whose plan presented
the least risk or the least radical change.

Others said the location

of presumption should be debated in the round if it was critical
to the team's stand.

One judge felt that "because neither team

enjoys presumption it becomes an irrelevant concept in the round."
Another said it was confusing and still another said that he was
undecided as to its location.
What must the affirmative do to defeat the counterplan?
Of the eighty-seven judges who stated their philosophies on
counterplanning, fifty-six (60.1%) responded specifically to the
portion of the question dealing with affirmative strategies in a
counterplan situation.

In a counterplan debate, the affirmative must continue to
perform "normal" affirmative duties.

They must present a prima facie

case, maintain the burden of proof, and prove that the resolution
should be adopted.

Their duties are increased, however, because

they must go beyond an extension of their own case and prove that
the counterplan should not be adopted.
The two issues considered as most debatable by the affirmative
were non-topicality and non-competiveness.

Next in importance,

according to references on the philosophy sheets, was the advantagedisadvantage issue (47.8%).

The fourth most frequently mentioned

issue was plan superiority (24.6%) which was not specifically defined
in most instances and could be determined by several factors.

Few

of the systems theory judges mentioned specific affirmative attacks.
The affirmative may show that the negative has not met any of
the non-topicality and competitiveness requirements discussed pre
viously in this section of the paper.

Topicality can be considered

with a bias in favor of the affirmative.

It may be necessary to

debate the non-competiveness of the counterplan from a theoretical
perspective as well as from the more standard approaches.
To win the advantage-disadvantage issue, the affirmative should
deal with the disadvantages of the counterplan.

They may prove

that the counterplan has unique disadvantages, more disadvantages
than the affirmative plan, or more significant disadvantages.

This was the response of fifteen of the judges who addressed them
selves to this issue (45.5%).

Proving added affirmative advantages

and sustaining original advantages was considered a winning
strategy by 33.3 percent of the judges.

Once the affirmative has

shown that their plan can meet their advantages, they can refute the
counterplan advantages.

Then they can show (1) that the negative

cannot accrue the same level of advantages through on-balance com
parison, (2) that their plan has fewer disadvantages than the counterplan and/or (3) that the advantage-disadvantage ratio for the
affirmative plan is better than the negative ratio.
The affirmative must defend the superiority of their approach.
They may show that their plan is the better means of achieving their
advantages, that fewer disadvantages are entailed, and/or that given
the limited resources available, their plan constitutes a better
expenditure of those resources.
Though not mentioned as frequently as those issues above,
solvency can be another issue in the debate.

The affirmative must

illustrate their ability to solve the problems more effectively
than the counterplan because the final decision for some judges is
based on which team sustains solvency in a superior fashion.
When the debate is viewed, and debated, from a systems theory
approach, the affirmative must defend the workability and advantages
of their plan and compare or refute the negative advantages.

They

should employ a cost-benefit comparative analysis wherever feasible.
In some instances, they may be able to prove that the counterplan
can be subsumed under the affirmative plan.
Other important affirmative strategies are as follows;

(1)

Make the negative position seem less rational and/or desireable
than the resolution.

(2) Argue on the basis of argumentation theory

and real-world policy making.

(3) Argue that the added advantages

the negative claims can occur or are occurring under the status quo.
How are your judging procedures affected by the presentation of a
counterplan?
In responding to this portion of the question a frequent comment
was:

"I reach for more flow material" because the debaters are

dealing with arguments for and against two separate plans rather
than for and against one plan.

When a systems approach is used,

the problem becomes further confounded because both case and plan
structures differ since the affirmative problem area need not be
accepted.
There was little consistency in the judging procedures expressed
by the respondents.

Several said they viewed the counterplan simply

as another policy option or another issue in the round.

The next

most frequent response was that they tended to judge the two plans
comparatively.

Some said the criteria for acceptance or rejection

of the counterplan were left to the debaters in each round.

Many other judging procedures were mentioned which could serve
as guidelines for potential counterplan use.

They were as follows:

(1) Since the counterplan is a controversial strategy, debaters
should introduce arguments which support their views of counterplan theory.
or issues.

These should then be related to their specific strategies
(2) The judge enters with no preconceived view of what

is best (i.e., no presumption) and evaluates the teams on the basis
of the arguments in the round.

(3) The issues of competitiveness

and advantages become more important than in a "standard" round.
(4) The choices between teams becomes narrower and therefore minor
factors get promoted in a decision.

(5) Arguments which support or

refute are evaluated by the same criteria as in any other debate.
(6) In the end, the question is which "resolution"
better.

appears to be

(7) If the judge has any doubts or reservations about the

counterplan, the ballot will go affirmative.

(8) If the negative

has solvency, advantages, and competitiveness, the debate will re
volve around a comparison of advantages and disadvantages.

(9) In

the event that neither policy is a winner, the decision goes to the
plan which advocates the least change.

(10) If the negative argues

the case and wins the theoretical issues related to the counterplan,
the decision is based on the political decision-making model, focused
around the traditional stock issues.
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Of the eighty-seven judges in the study, sixty-seven (77%)
listed a series of 3 or 4 critical areas or issues on which the
debate should focus.

By far, the most important of these were

topicality and competitiveness.

The seven most frequently mentioned

areas are listed below in order of descending importance as in
ferred from incidence of mention.
1.

Topicality

2.

Competitiveness

3.

Added, superior, or unique advantages

4.

Solvency

5.

Mutually exclusive

6.

Superior option

7.

Disadvantages to plan.

Other voting issues mentioned were inherency, plan entails less
risk, counterplan does/does not preclude affirmative plan, substitutable, same or similar advantages, diminished case significance
and ability to argue stock issues.

In all, fourteen different

critical areas were noted by the judges.
To win the counterplan debate, the negative must win all of the three
or four

areas deemed critical by that particular judge.

The af

firmative need win only one of the areas against the counterplan.
A problem exists here because the debater, unless he has been
judged by the individual previously or has one of the judge's
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philosophy sheets available, does not know which of the areas or
issues he must win.
helpful.

Some consistent list of criteria would be

At present, the debaters can only hope that they will

select the right areas or that the judge will decide the critical
areas as they are debated by the two teams.
1974 and 1975 Booklets of Judges - Conditional Counterplans
During the 1973-74 and 1974-75 debate seasons there was con
siderable controversy over the conditional counterplan, a strategy
in which the negative upholds both the status quo and the counterplan
through an "even if" argument.

That is, "even if" the status quo

were not functioning properly, the negative counterplan would be
better than the affirmative plan.

To provide teams with knowledge

of the judges' bias on this case structure, the question, "How do
you generally react to conditional counterplans?" was included on
the National Debate Tournament questionnaire.
To analyze the data from these philosophy sheets, a 5-point
accept-reject scale was used which included "accept, accept with
reservations, neutral or non-commital, reject with reservations,
and reject."

An example of a statement classified as "accept with

reservations" was "I accept those that are offered to attack the
significance of the affirmative case."

A "reject with reservations"

response was "I am not particularly receptive to conditional counterplans. . .[but] I have voted on [them]."
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In 1974, nineteen of the seventy-six judges did not respond
to the question, discussed the counterplan instead of the conditional
counterplan or said that they had not heard any conditional counterplans; therefore, the philosophy sheets of these judges were not
considered.

This left fifty-seven judges with valid answers.

The

results are shown in Table I.

TABLE I.

1974 NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT

Reaction to Conditional Counterplan

Number

Percent

Accept

19

33.3

Accept with reservations

11

19.3

3

5.0

Reject with reservations

12

21.1

Reject

12

21.1

Neutral

As can be noted, a slightly larger percentage (52.6%) accepted
the conditional counterplan than rejected it (42.4%).
The philosophy sheets for this year were the only ones which
listed years of coaching experience.

Cox, in a similar study of

these philosophy sheets found that the majority (71.8%) of those
who rejected the conditional counterplan had 6 or more years coaching
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experience while those who accepted the conditional counterplan were
about equally divided between coaches with 1 to 5 years experience
v51

(51.5%) and those with 6 or more years (48.5)

When the question was again asked in 1975, seven of the eightyfour judges solicited for comments (8.3%) did not respond to the
question in contrast to 13.1 percent who had not responded the previous
year.

Three of the ballots could not be classified.

seventy-four ballots were utilized in this study.

Therefore,

The results and

comparisons with the preceding year are listed in Table II.

TABLE II.

1975 NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT

Reaction to
Conditional Counterplan

Percent
Change

Number

Percent

Number

25

33.8

+8

Accept with reservations

7

9.5

Neutral

3

4.1

Reject with reservations

10

13.5

-2

- 7.6

Reject

29

39.2

+17

+18.1

Accept

-4
—

+

.5

-12.5
—
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J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the
Participants of the National Debate Tournament," Journal of the
American Forensic Association XI (1974), p. 69.
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Apparently judges were conmitting themselves more in their
views of the conditional counterplan.

The trend was toward re

jection of this strategy rather than toward acceptance though the
difference between the two views was not large (43.3% accepting,
52.7% rejecting).

However, in comparison with the previous year's

totals it can be noted that both the decrease in acceptance and the
increase in rejection were approximately 10 percent.
Some of the judges felt that a counterplan was the same, or
utilized the same strategies, whether it was conditional or straight
and must be debated as such.

They stated that the conditional

counterplan must be shown to be a coherent policy system, not con
tingent on the adoption of the resolution.

For the negative to win

with a conditional counterplan significance must be demonstrated and
not assumed from general evidence, "plan objectives must go beyond
mere observations" and the superiority of the negative approach must
be demonstrated.

Some indicated conditional counterplans needed

more care and preparation than was usually given them.
When a conditional counterplan is used, the affirmative grants
the negative inherency and significance.

Superiority of their

approach can be demonstrated by proving additional advantages, the
absence of affirmative disadvantages, superior solvency, or a less
radical departure from the status quo with less risk and greater
predictability involved.

Several of those who rejected the conditional counterplan did
so because they felt time restrictions precluded the debate of three
positions.

Another common view was that the conditional counter-

plan was inconsistent with the policy system approach in that the
negative "avoid[s] the advocation of a substitute system from the
perspective of actually, not conditionally, choosing a course of
action."

Others said they preferred the negative to argue a con

sistent philosophical position

and in the conditional counterplan

debate they were unsure of what the negative policy system was.
One judge considered the counterplan a weak method of attack
and the conditional counterplan an even weaker method.
expressed were:

Other views

"It's a cop-out for the negative because they seem

to want the best of both worlds."

The negative is risking too

much while they try to maintain presumption.
loss of presumption."

"It is a horrendous

"I don't feel obligated to listen to a

negative rationale for a change as well as a justification of the
status quo."
Typical comments of the most opposed were:

"Since I can't cast

conditional ballots, I don't care for conditional counterplans."
"A counterplan is like death--quite a commitment.

You cannot be

a little dead, a little pregnant or a 'conditional' counterplan."
Those who were willing to accept the conditional counterplan
less frequently explained their reasons.

Some felt that because
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debate is for discussing debatable issues it was acceptable.

Others

said that the conditional counterplan should be considered in the
light of policy options.

Those who qualified their answers said the

conditional counterplan was acceptable if it was presented as a
"conditional" counterplan, if it was designed to meet only part of
the affirmative plan or if it was offered as an attack against the
significance of the affirmative case.

One judge stated that the

negative should not present a conditional counterplan and then attempt
to drop it in rebuttals.
1976 Booklet of Judges
The 1976 questionnaires did not contain a question on counterplans, however, some judges stated their counterplanning preferences
under the question, "Must the negative, like the affirmative,
support a specific policy proposal?

Why or why not?"

There were fifteen responses on the conditional counterplan.
Of those, seven said they would accept a conditional counterplan,
two would accept them with reservations and six rejected them.

If

conclusions can be drawn from these few philosophy sheets, it would
appear that the trend toward acceptance of the conditional counterplan had increased slightly from 1975.
The reverse was true on the 1977 philosophy sheets, however.
Of twenty-two judges who commented on the conditional counterplan,
seven (31.8%) said they would accept them, while the same number
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(7) said they were not receptive to conditional counterplans and
eight (36.4%) said they would reject them.

Thus, the percentage

rejecting the conditional counterplan increased greatly.
Counterplan
The response on the 1976 questionnaire was the opposite for
the counterplan.

Of the twenty-three judges who commented on the

counterplan, eighteen (78.3%) were in favor of the strategy.

Only

one judge indicated he would not support a counterplan while three
(13%) said that they didn't particularly like them.

This last

figure can be compared with 8.3 percent who, in 1977, said they
didn't care for counterplans.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
When a counterplan is employed, the nature of debate changes.
It moves from a bipolar situation with a single solution to one
which permits a multi-sided examination of the problem.

The

question changes from "Should we have international control of world
resources?" to "Should we have international control of world re
sources or something else?"

As with the affirmative's comparative ad

vantage, alternative justification, and criteria cases, the counterplans has enlarged the scope of debate.

It can be considered the

embodiment of a negative justification argument.

With such theo

retical growth, debate has become more complicated and more in
tellectually challenging.
Unfortunately debate theory has lagged behind debate practice.
For example, the 1975 edition of Strategic Debate said counterplans were uncommon,
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yet in practice, counterplans were sufficiently

common that judges at that year's National Debate Tournament were
asked their opinions of the conditional counterplan.

Those opinions

would serve as guidelines for the debaters at the same tourna
ment.
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Wood, p. 121.
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As with any change within a structure, guidelines for implemen
tation must be established if counterplans are to be utilized ef
fectively.

In the absence of comprehensive guidelines for counter-

plan debate, as it exists today, literature and judging practices
have been examined with the intent of formulating a more concrete
view of the counterplan debate.
In reviewing the context of this paper, it can be noted that
two debate theories exist which can be applied to the counterplan.
The first of these, traditional theory, has been the predominant
view and is the perspective of the majority of the texts.

When

utilizing the traditional theory approach, the counterplan debater
will focus on the need issue as defined by the affirmative.

In

the more recent of the two approaches, systems theory, analysis deals
with multiple causality and equifinality.

This perspective, though

introduced only five years ago, has gained acceptance by one-third
of the coaches and judges at the 1977 National Debate Tournament.
These individuals represent a major influence in debate practice
today.

Systems theory has provided the debater increased options,

over and above those already afforded by the counterplan.
Theorists have said that a counterplan must be prima facie,
non-topical and competitive.

A competitive counterplan may be

functionally competitive, structurally or philosophically competitive,
mutually exclusive or more desireable when implemented alone than
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when enacted with the affirmative plan.

The judges have indicated

acceptance of these definitions and further defined them.
Other issues in a counterplan debate include solvency, superiority
and advantages-disadvantages.
theorists views of solvency.

Judges have substantiated and qualified
They have stressed the importance of

proving the superiority of the counterplan and stated ways in which
this can be accomplished, primarily through the use of advantages
and disadvantages.

Of the 3 issues stated above, the judges' most

important contribution has been in the delineation of advantagedisadvantage attacks.

Though a variety of strategies have been

mentioned, the predominant view is that the debater must prove his
plan is more advantageous than that of the affirmative and show the
disadvantages of their plan.
Theorists have been responsible for the structures of the counterplan debate, while both they and the judges have specified strategies
which may be used by the affirmative and negative teams.

In general,

the strategies noted by the judges have been more specific.
The location of presumption can be a factor in the decision
reached on a counterplan debate.
rests with the negative.

As defined by Whatley, presumption

Views on the location of presumption in

a "standard" debate have never been consistent and they are even
more inconsistent in a counterplan debate; however, one-half of the
judges noted, said the negative forfeits presumption in a counterplan situation.
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The conditional counterplan, an alternative to the "standard"
counterplan, has elicited mixed responses from judges.

Though

views fluctuate, judges tend to be about equally divided in their
reactions.
If the two debate theories, traditional and systems, are to
continue to be utilized in counterplan debate, proponents of each
must be knowledgeable about the other theory as well so that either
style of counterplan can be debated effectively and judged with
expertise.

To assist in understanding the similarities and dif

ferences the following chart has been prepared from material in
this paper.
Comparison of Counterplan Judging Requirements
According to Traditional and Systems Theory

General

Affirmative Need

Traditional

Systems Theory

Particular problem and

Multiple causes and

solution

interaction

Accepted or accepted

Need not be accepted

in part
Competitive

Functionally Competi-

Mutually exclusive,

tive, structurally or

cannot exist simul-

philosophically com-

taneously with affir-

petitive, deals with

mative plan
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Systems Theory

Traditional
same problem areas as
affirmative

Meet affirmative advantages
Other Requirements

Solvency
Non-topical
Prima facie
Superior option

Clash

Meets competitiveness
definitions
Advantages-

Achieve affirmative

Disadvantages

advantages
Accrue more or better advantages
Fewer disadvantages

Affirmative must

Workability

defend

Superior
Fewer disadvantages
More advantages
Cost-benefit comparison
Show counterplan can be
subsumed
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Presumption

Traditional

Systems Theory

Rests with status quo

Rests with system with
greater degree of certainty

Percentage of judges

54.8%

32.5%

generally employing
these approaches in
1977.

Counterplan theory is still in its infancy, but by synthesizing
judge's comments with theory it is possible to establish a new
theoretical base.

Though in some instances, conflicting views have

not precipitated conclusive definitions or strategies, they are never
theless facilitative.

The debater and/or judge can either circumvent

or anticipate those discrepancies.

To promote proficient counterplan

debates, however, theoretical approaches in textbooks must be updated
so that debaters and coaches may have easy accessibility to a com
plete and comprehensive theoretical background of the counterplan.
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